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Individualized Affirmative Defenses Bar
Class Certification-Per Se
PriyaLaroiat

Black's Law Dictionary defines an affirmative defense as a
"defendant's assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if
true, will defeat the plaintiffs or prosecutor's claim, even if all

allegations in the complaint are true."' Courts often consider affirmative defenses when making class certification determinations.2 However, they disagree about the amount of weight to afford affirmative defenses, especially when these defenses turn on
facts unique to each individual's case.' Examples of individualized defenses include contributory negligence and statutes of
limitations.4 This disagreement has led to a circuit split in which
the Fourth Circuit has found class certification erroneous if individualized affirmative defenses exist. 5 Other circuits, however,
have rejected this per se rule.
In Broussard v Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc,7 the
Fourth Circuit held that when affirmative defenses turn on individual issues, "class certification is erroneous."' The court decided
this issue while analyzing a class's satisfaction of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23") certification prerequisites

B.A. 2001, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Chicago.
2

Black's Law Dictionary 430 (West 7th ed 1999).
See, for example, Waste Management Holdings, Inc v Mowbray, 208 F3d 288, 295

(1st Cir 2000) (claiming that settled law authorizes consideration of affirmative defenses
in certification decisions); Castanov American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734, 744 (5th Cir 1996)
(arguing that a court must understand claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable
substantive law before certifying a class).
' See, for example, Mowbray, 208 F3d at 296 (arguing against giving individualized
defenses so much weight that they become a per se bar to certification); Broussardv Meineke DiscountMuffler Shops, Inc, 155 F3d 331, 342 (4th Cir 1998) (advocating a per se bar
to certification when individualized affirmative defenses exist within a case).
Black's Law Dictionary 430 (cited in note 1).
See Broussard, 155 F3d at 342.
6 See, for example, Mowbray, 208 F3d at 296; In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation,
305 F3d 145, 162-63 (3d Cir 2002).
155 F3d 331 (4th Cir 1998).
See id at 342.
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that appear in subsection (a) of the rule. 9 The First Circuit, in
Waste Management Holdings, Inc v Mowbray, ° rejected the position set forth in Broussard-that individualized affirmative defenses create a per se bar to class certification. According to
Mowbray, the Fourth Circuit's decision contradicted precedent
and "[ignored] the essence of the predominance inquiry" mandated by Rule 23(b)(3)." The First Circuit did not address the fact
that the Fourth Circuit had rendered its rule with regard to Rule
23(a) and that it had not even considered the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement in its Broussard decision. 2
The existence of a single individualized affirmative defense
could shift a representative plaintiffs interests away from those
of some members of the class, despite shared interests in the
claims of the case.1 3 For instance, in a case where the defendant
raises a contributory negligence defense, a representative plaintiff whose claim is not affected by the defense may not argue as
strongly for strict liability theories as an affected, absent class
member would argue for them.
This Comment advocates the per se bar adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in Broussard. Part I outlines the current state of
the law surrounding this issue. Part I A outlines and explains the
requirements for certification appearing in Rule 23. Part I B explores the proper analysis for courts to use in the decision to certify a class. Part I C details the case law regarding the role of affirmative defenses at the certification stage and discusses the
current circuit split. Part I D discusses the First Circuit's apparent disregard of the distinction between Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b)(3) in Mowbray.
Part II of this Comment argues in favor of the per se bar in
the context of the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a), but not in the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance context. The reason for this distinction, as described in Part II, derives from the mandates of the different subsections of Rule 23. Part III explains that while the Broussard
per se bar appears to contradict precedent, the holding is, in fact,
See id at 337 n 3 (noting that the court need not address any Rule 23(b) requirements because the class did not satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisites to class certification).
208 F3d 288 (ist Cir 2000).
Id at 296 n 4.
12 Broussardinvolved a plea for certification under Rule 23(b)(2), thus the court had
no opportunity to consider the relation of the per se bar to the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
inquiry. See Broussard, 155 F3d at 337.
13 See id at 342.
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a natural outgrowth of the important Supreme Court class certification decision in Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin.4 Finally, Part
IV argues for strict adherence to the Eisen principle: a court
should not examine the substantive merits of a claim in making
certification decisions. 5 The per se bar provides a means to ensure that courts do not violate this principle. Part IV also details
why, despite criticism to the contrary, the per se bar does not create an opportunity for defendants to engage in strategic behavior
to avoid class certification.
I. THE STATE OF CURRENT LAW
The circuit split over the per se bar arose from confusion in
the law. Courts often have muddled the distinctions between the
various requirements for certification under Rule 23.16 Although
the Supreme Court has issued decisions indicating the appropriate scope of a certification inquiry, 7 these decisions sometimes
have added to courts' questions about the appropriate analysis at
the certification stage.18 In order to assess the propriety of the per
se bar against individualized affirmative defenses, it is necessary
to examine certification analysis generally and determine how
and when the per se bar would apply.
A. Certification Under Rule 23
Rule 23 governs class certification. 9 Rule 23(a) provides the
four prerequisites to class certification.2° Rule 23(b) details the
three types of class action suits allowed by the Federal Rules. 21 A
417 US 156 (1974).
See id at 177.
,6 See, for example, Barnes v American Tobacco Co, 161 F3d 127, 141 (3d Cir 1998)
'4
'5

(noting that the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge).
" See General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 160 (1982) (requiring courts to probe behind the pleadings when necessary to making an informed certification decision); Eisen, 417 US at 177 (prohibiting courts from making a preliminary
merits inquiry at the certification stage).
"S See, for example, Love v Turlington, 733 F2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir 1984) (stating
that although a trial court cannot look at the merits of a case at the certification stage, a
court should not artificially invoke this principle to avoid examining the necessary factors
in a certification decision); Blackie v Barrack, 524 F2d 891, 901 (9th Cir 1975) (noting that
because a trial judge cannot engage in a preliminary merits inquiry at the certification
stage, he must necessarily decide the issue with some speculation); Huff v N.D. Cass Co of
Alabama, 485 F2d 710, 714 (5th Cir 1973) (recognizing the tension between the two different approaches to class certification).
I
FRCP 23.
FRCP 23(a).
FRCP 23(b).
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class must satisfy all of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites and fit into
one of the Rule 23(b) classifications in order to achieve certification.2
Under Rule 23(a), plaintiffs first must prove that the size of
the potential class makes joinder of all of the class members impracticable.' Second, the commonality requirement demands that
there be questions of law or fact common to the entire class.'
Named plaintiffs can satisfy this requirement by showing that
they have at least one question of law or fact in common with the
prospective class.Y" Third, under the typicality prerequisite, the
claims and defenses of the representative parties must be typical
of the claims and defenses of the class. 26 This requirement asks
the court to examine the efficiency of maintaining the class and to
determine whether the interests of the named plaintiffs are sufficiently aligned with those of the absentee plaintiffs to warrant
consolidation. 27 Finally, a court may certify a class only if "the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."2 Courts often refer to this requirement as
the "adequacy of representation" element of Rule 23(a).2
After a court determines that a class meets the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, it must also ensure that the class fits into one of
the Rule 23(b) categories. Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) authorize mandatory class actions. Mandatory class actions are those in
which class members cannot avoid the preclusive nature of a
class judgment by opting out of the litigation and pursuing their
claims individually.' Parties often seek certification under Rule
23(b)(1) when defendants have only a limited fund from which to
pay plaintiffs' damages.3 ' In these cases, courts use the mandatory class action device to avoid situations in which the first
plaintiffs that successfully adjudicate their claims deplete the
z FRCP 23.
FRCP 23(a)(1).
21 FRCP 23(a)(2).
See Baby Neal for and by Kanter v Casey, 43 F3d 48, 56 (3d Cir 1994), citing In re
"Agent Orange"Products Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir 1987).
FRCP 23(a)(3).
See Baby Neal, 43 F3d at 57, citing Weiss v York Hospital, 745 F2d 786, 810 (3d Cir
1984).
FRCP 23(a)(4).
See Ortiz v FibreboardCorp, 527 US 815, 828 n 6 (1999) (detailing the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a)).
30 See id at 833 n 13 (noting that in a mandatory class action, absentee plaintiffs may
not exclude themselves from class membership).
" See id at 834-35 (noting that the limited fund case is a recurring type of case under
Rule 23(b)(1)(b)).
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defendants' funds, effectively denying relief to the rest of the injured plaintiffs.32 In Rule 23(b)(2) mandatory class actions, an
injunction or declaratory relief provides the appropriate remedy
for the class.'
Unlike Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes, Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions allow class members to opt out of a class.3" In order
to certify a class in the Rule 23(b)(3) category, the court must determine that "questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members" and that the class action method is superior to
other means of adjudicating the plaintiffs' claims.3
B. Ruling on the Merits in Class Certification Decisions
When a court makes a certification decision, it must decide
how deeply to examine the case in order to detect or anticipate
factors that may undermine the proposed class's satisfaction of
Rule 23.3 Such factors include affirmative defenses.3 ' Therefore,
in order to assess how courts should treat affirmative defenses, it
is first necessary to consider the broader debate about the degree
to which a court may analyze the substantive merits of a case
when ruling on class certification.
The Supreme Court, in Eisen, explicitly declared that Rule 23
does not authorize a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a case
at the certification stage.8 In a 1982 employment discrimination
case, General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon,39 however,
the Court declared that a court sometimes may need to "probe
beyond the pleadings" before determining the propriety of class
certification. 40 In making this statement, the Court relied on language from a 1978 case, Coopers & Lybrand v Livesay. 4 ' The
Court in Coopers refused to exempt class certification decisions
32 See id.

FRCP 23(b)(2).
FRCP 23(c)(2).
FRCP 23(b)(3).
See Huff, 485 F2d at 713-14 (discussing a court's need to make decisions about the
extent of discovery and the extent of examination of the merits at the certification stage).
" See Mowbray, 208 F3d at 295 (stating that settled law requires courts to consider
affirmative defenses in certification inquiries).
See Eisen, 417 US at 177 (noting that a merits inquiry at the certification stage
would bestow the benefits of a class action on the plaintiffs before they satisfied the Rule
23 requirements).
457 US 147 (1982).
Id at 160.
See id, citing Coopers & Lybrand v Livesay, 437 US 463, 469 (1978).
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from the final-judgment rule. 42 The Court rendered this decision
because of the interrelation between certification and the factual
and legal elements of a plaintiffs claim.4 While the Coopers decision does not speak to the appropriate scope of a certification decision, it does reveal the complexity of certification questions by
demonstrating that they force courts to determine which elements of an interwoven factual and legal pattern to consider.
From the outset, it may appear that Eisen and Falcon disagree about whether a court can conduct a preliminary inquiry
into the merits of a case at the certification stage. Although a
tension exists between Eisen and Falcon, courts have dutifully
attempted to comply with the mandates of both decisions." Instead of interpreting the decisions as contradictory or mutually
exclusive, courts have tried to find the fine line between engaging
in a preliminary merits inquiry and probing beyond the pleadings
to determine whether a class meets the certification requirements. The Eleventh Circuit discussed this tension in Love v
Turlington," when deciding whether to certify a class challenging
the constitutionality of a standardized state test administered to
eleventh graders.4 Love acknowledged that a trial court cannot
decide the merits of a certification question but declared: "this
principle should not be talismanically invoked to artificially limit
a trial court's examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned
determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of establishing each of the Rule 23 class action requirements."47 While
this statement does reveal the Eleventh Circuit's willingness to
work within the Supreme Court's boundaries, it does not provide
guidance to other courts facing the same predicament.
C. Certification Decisions and Affirmative Defenses
As with the rest of certification law, courts' views differ regarding the proper amount of weight to accord affirmative defenses at the certification stage. This confusion, coupled with the
" The final-judgment rule prohibits parties from appealing a lower court decision
unless it represents the final judgment in a case. See Coopers, 437 US at 464-65, 465 n 1.
Very few judicial decisions are excepted from the final-judgment rule. See id at 468.
43 See id at 469.
" See, for example, Love v Turlington, 733 F2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir 1984); Blackie,
524 F2d at 901; Huff, 485 F2d at 714.
" 733 F2d 1562 (11th Cir 1984).
46 See id at 1564 (upholding the denial of certification because of a failure to satisfy
Rule 23(a) commonality and typicality requirements).
47 Id.
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tension between Eisen and Falcon, gave rise to the current circuit
split.
1. Consideringaffirmative defenses.
Although courts often consider affirmative defenses during
the certification stage, courts differ in how much value to attribute to the existence of the defenses. Some courts use the existence
of individualized affirmative defenses as a determinative factor,
while others simply include them in the balancing of issues undertaken in a certification decision.8 These differences provide
the basis for the current debate and circuit split over the per se
bar.
Despite the ambiguity generated by the tension between the
Eisen and Falcon rulings, the First Circuit believes that settled
law requires courts to consider affirmative defenses when making
certification decisions. 49 In support of this position, the Mowbray
court cited the Fifth Circuit's decision in Castano v American Tobacco Co.5° The Castano court approved of courts looking beyond
the pleadings at the certification stage in order to understand not
only defenses, but also pertinent claims, facts, and law.51
Other circuits have likewise considered affirmative defenses
when making certification rulings. For example, in Barnes v
American Tobacco Co,52 the Third Circuit decided that affirmative
defenses, as well as causation and addiction issues, generated too
many individual questions to permit certification.' By contrast,
the Ninth Circuit, in Williams v Sinclair,' found that a class alleging securities violations satisfied the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b), even though a statute of limitations defense
presented individual issues.*
Given the Williams decision, it is somewhat surprising that
another Ninth Circuit decision provides precedent for the current
controversy. In In re N D of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods
4

See, for example, Mowbray, 208 F3d at 295 (claiming that settled law authorizes

consideration of affirmative defenses in certification decisions); Castano v American Tobacco Co, 84 F3d 734, 744 (5th Cir 1996) (arguing that a court must understand claims,
defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law before certifying a class).
' Mowbray, 208 F3d at 295.
Id, citing Castano, 84 F3d at 744.
Castano, 84 F3d at 744.
52 161 F3d 127 (3d Cir 1998).
Id at 143.
529 F2d 1383 (9th Cir 1975).
See id at 1388.
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Liab Litig," the Ninth Circuit reviewed a Northern District of
California judge's decision to consolidate numerous suits filed
against a medical manufacturer. 5 The Ninth Circuit discussed
generally how individual issues might outnumber common ones
in products liability cases because of the potential affirmative
defenses, such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
and the statute of limitations, that can arise. 8The court found
that the class could not meet the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a) because of the possibility of different representations,
warnings, and injuries, as well as the different defenses available.5' The court also found that the class did not satisfy the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a)
or meet any of the Rule 23(b) requirements because of additional
causation, duty of care, and warranty differences among the putative class members. 0 Although the court did not explicitly discuss the issue, the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have advocated a per se bar to certification when affirmative defenses exist
in a case. In fact, the discussion in Dalkon about the class's many
flaws indicates that affirmative defenses served as only a single
factor in the court's decision to deny certification. 1
2. The circuit split.
The current circuit split arose from this rather murky body of
law. The split stems from widespread confusion regarding the
issues in this area of class certification law and, arguably, from a
misapplication of precedent. Although individualized affirmative
defenses apparently played only a small part in the Ninth Circuit's refusal of class certification in Dalkon and did not persuade
the court to bar certification in Williams, the Fourth Circuit cited
the Dalkon decision in Broussard.
In Broussard, a class of franchisees claimed that their fran62
chiser's advertising practices constituted a breach of contract.
Individual contracts required franchisees to financially contribute

693 F2d 847 (9th Cir 1982).
See id at 848-49 (pointing out that the district court consolidated the suits without
the consent of the parties and without providing notice of status hearings to out-of-state
parties).
" Id at 853.
'9 Id at 854.
"0 Dalkon, 693 F2d at 854-56.
17

61

Id.

12

Broussard,155 F3d at 334.
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behalf.63
to the advertising that the franchiser undertook on their
The plaintiffs claimed that the franchiser wastefully expended
the franchisees' contributions by retaining advertising agencies
with very high rates of commission.64 The class sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2). 65 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the class
did not meet the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a) and overturned the lower
court's decision to certify.66 First, the court explained that a statute of limitations defense turned on facts specific to each individual plaintiff's case.67 Second, the court worried that the diversity
among the class members would create a conflict of interest that
might undermine the adequacy of representation prong.68 The
Fourth Circuit, quoting Dalkon, stated: "the Ninth Circuit has
recognized, when the defendant's 'affirmative defenses (such as..
. the statute of limitations) may depend on facts peculiar to each
plaintiff's case,' class certification is erroneous." 69 Thus, the court
adopted the per se bar.
The First Circuit, in Mowbray, rejected the Fourth Circuit's
position." The plaintiffs in Mowbray alleged that the defendant,
Waste Management, had overstated its earnings to the detriment
of stock purchasers.71 The representative plaintiff of the class had
sold his business to Waste Management in exchange for Waste
Management stock. This exchange took place under a contract
asserting the validity of Waste Management's past earnings reports.7 3 It was later revealed, however, that these reports overstated true earnings. 4 The district court certified a class of all of
the investors who had relied to their detriment on the validity of
the overstated reports.75 The First Circuit granted Waste Management's request for an interlocutory appeal on the class certification issue.76 Waste Management's only claim on appeal was
63

Id.

"

Id at 335.
6' Id at 336.
Broussard, 155 F3d at 352.
o7 Id at 340.
68Id at 337.
66 Id at 342, quoting Dalkon, 693 F2d at 853 (omission in original).
o See Mowbray, 208 F3d at 296 n 4.
I See id at 291.
72 Id.
73 Id.
71 See Mowbray, 208 F3d at 291.
75 Id at 292.
76

Id.
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that the certified class did not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).7 The court acknowledged that affirmative
defenses weigh against the decision to certify a class but rejected
the Fourth Circuit's position that when such defenses exist, certification is always erroneous.78 The court insisted that judges
should not reduce the predominance requirement to a "mechanical, single-issue test."79 It found that sufficient common issues
could predominate over an individualized defense, such as a statute of limitations defense. 80 The decision emphasized that accepting the Fourth Circuit's position would contradict precedent and
ignore the "essence of the predominance inquiry."81
The Mowbray court never addressed the fact that the Broussard decision only dealt with the commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a).8 2 Broussard did not purport to make any statements about the predominance inquiry's essence. 83 In fact, the class in Broussard sought
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and, consequently, the Fourth
Circuit never considered the interrelation of the per se bar and
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement.84 Hence, these two
decisions may not provide as direct a conflict as a cursory reading
might imply.
Nevertheless, in In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation,5 the
Third Circuit similarly erred in echoing Mowbray's rejection of
Broussard.8' The Linerboard case involved a class seeking Rule
23(b)(3) certification based on allegations of a Sherman Act 87 antitrust violation.88 Plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers of a
material used to make corrugated paper and containers had lowered production rates, and therefore supply, in order to increase
demand and, thus, prices.8 9 The district court certified a class of

7 Id at 295.
78 See Mowbray, 208 F3d at 296, 296 n 4 (accepting the result in Broussardbut rejecting the Fourth Circuit's position to the extent that it creates a per se rule).
'9 Id at 296.
80

Id.

87

Id at 296 n 4.
See Broussard, 155 F3d at 352.

82

8 See id at 337 n 3 (refusing to decide whether the class met the Rule 23(b) requirements because it failed to meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)).
Id at 336.
87 In re LinerboardAntitrust Litigation, 305 F3d 145 (3d Cir 2002).
86 Id.
87

89

15 USC § 1 (2000).
Linerboard,305 F3d at 148.
Id at 150-51.
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paper purchasers and a class of container purchasers. 9° The Third
Circuit acknowledged that some elements of a statute of limitations defense would require individualized proof but refused to
apply the per se bar advocated by the Fourth Circuit. 91 The court
found that, despite the individual issues, the class satisfied the
predominance requirement. 2 The court favored adjudication of
any individualized factual issues in the same fashion that courts
determine individualized damages rewards.' Like Mowbray, the
Linerboard opinion did not discuss the fact that Broussard dealt
solely with Rule 23(a) requirements.
D. The Lost Distinction
Despite the courts' apparent disregard for the distinction between Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), each section demands a very
different inquiry. The two sections protect parties from distinctive harms and serve different underlying purposes. Rule 23(a)
focuses on protecting absentee plaintiffs, while Rule 23(b)(3) balances the class mechanism against other forms of litigation.'
The Supreme Court has stated that the commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. 9 Both requirements help determine whether maintaining a class action
would be economical and whether the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of the class sufficiently overlap.9 This overlap
helps ensure that the named plaintiffs will protect the interests
of the class members.' The adequacy of representation prong of
Rule 23(a) similarly requires courts to investigate the abilities of
the representative plaintiffs to protect the interests of the absentee plaintiffs.9
In contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requires that common issues constitute a significant part of each individual case.99
Many courts have found that as long as common issues predomi-

o Id at 149.
Id at 163 (noting that the court found the First Circuit's reasoning more persuasive
than that of the Fourth Circuit).
9

Linerboard,305 F3d at 163.

13

Id.
FRCP 23.

See Falcon, 457 US at 157-58 n 13.
Id.
Id.
FRCP 23(a)(4).
See Jenkins v Raymark Industries, Inc, 782 F2d 468, 472 (5th Cir 1968) (approving
certification of common questions in an asbestos case).
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nate, the existence of individual issues does not preclude class
certification.1m
l Hence, although the predominance requirement
may protect the interests of absentee plaintiffs in some circumstances, Rule 23(a) explicitly focuses on that protection.
Some courts have noted that the threshold for satisfying Rule
23(a) requirements is not high. '°' Plaintiffs often face more difficulty in satisfying the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3). 102 This level of difficulty should be inversed in the affirmative defense context, as discussed in Part II.
II. THE PER SE RULE SHOULD APPLY To RULE 23(a)
COMMONALITY, TYPICALITY, AND ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
DETERMINATIONS

Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites focus on a concern for protecting
absentee plaintiffs. Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance inquiry determines whether the class action is the superior method of adjudication owing to the existence of a common class goal. This distinction indicates that the per se bar should apply to Rule 23(a), but
not to Rule 23(b)(3). Like Rule 23(a), the bar shields plaintiffs
from having their claims adjudicated by representatives unable
to adequately protect their interests.
A. Rule 23(a) Demands the Per Se Bar
Rule 23(a)'s commonality and typicality prerequisites require
a court to consider the protection of absentee plaintiffs' interests. '°3 The presence of individualized affirmative defenses weighs
" See, for example, Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 623 (1997) (indicating that the predominance inquiry requires a balancing analysis of the individual and
common issues); Williams, 529 F2d at 1388 (stating that "[gliven a sufficient nucleus of
common questions, the presence of the individual issue" does not prevent certification in
securities class actions); Umbriac v American Snacks, Inc, 388 F Supp 265, 273 (E D Pa
1975) (noting that individual statute of limitations issues do not preclude maintenance of
a class action and that a court can resolve individual questions after the completion of the
class controversy); Lamb v United Security Life Co, 59 FRD 25, 34 (S D Iowa 1972) (finding that, in light of the importance of private securities actions, individualized statute of
limitations issues should only preclude certification if they predominate over common
issues).
,0' See Jenkins, 782 F2d at 472 (stating that class will satisfy the commonality requirement as long as there exists a need for and benefit from combining the claims and
will fulfill the typicality requirement if the class members share similar legal and remedial theories).
02 See id (noting that predominance requires that common issues constitute a significant part of each individual case).
03 See Falcon, 457 US at 157-58 n 13 (noting that the commonality and typicality
requirements tend to merge into a single inquiry).
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against representative plaintiffs' claims that a class satisfies
these prerequisites. Adequacy of representation also suffers when
affirmative defenses affect representative plaintiffs differently
than they affect absent plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, some courts have futilely attempted to allevi' °4
ate these problems while maintaining a class action. For in0 5 the Eastern District of New York
stance, in Doglow v Anderson,
held that if the plaintiffs prevailed on the common issues in the
litigation, the court, cooperating with both parties, would easily
develop procedures to resolve the individual issues.' ° In order to
carry out the order, the court mandated that the case not proceed
unless the plaintiffs could show a substantial possibility that they
could prevail on the merits.107 The Second Circuit overturned the
district court decision with explicit language discouraging the
district court from requiring that the plaintiffs essentially prove
the merits of their case prior to certification.' °' Perhaps the district court judge found that advantaging one party by making a
preliminary merits inquiry was necessary to achieve an economical disposition of individual issues. Such an approach, however,
cannot satisfy the mandate of Eisen, which explicitly declares
that Rule 23 does not authorize a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of the suit at the certification stage. ' °9
The adequacy of representation that absentee plaintiffs receive suffers when individualized affirmative defenses arise.
Some courts have found that even if individual issues would reduce the economy or the protection of absentee interests, certification is still proper. ° These courts seem to balance the economy
of maintaining a class action against the protection of absentee
interests. However, in a system where each plaintiff gets only a
single chance to adjudicate his claim, a court should minimize
any reduction in the protection of absentee interests.
The mere existence of an individualized affirmative defense
would alter the way that a representative plaintiff pursues the
" See Doglow v Anderson, 43 FRD 472, 491 (E D NY 1968), revd on other grounds,
438 F2d 825 (2d Cir 1971).
105

43 FRD 472 (E D NY 1968).

° Id at 491.
,o7 See id at 501.
See Doglow, 438 F2d at 830.
See Eisen, 417 US at 177.
110 See, for example, Santiago v City of Philadelphia,72 FRD 619, 628-29 (E D Pa
1976) (warning of the particularly damaging nature of individual issues in Rule 23(b)(2)
class actions but permitting the plaintiffs to prove that they could still satisfy the Rule
23(a) requirements).
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litigation because, presumably, each plaintiff wants to ensure his
own personal success in the case. For example, if a defendant asserts a contributory negligence claim that would not affect the
representative plaintiff but would affect other plaintiffs in the
class, the representative plaintiff and affected plaintiffs would
likely choose different litigation strategies. Those affected by the
defense might pursue strict liability theories or other claims that
could escape the application of the defense, even if these strategies presented less likelihood of eventual success. In contrast, the
representative plaintiff would avoid risks and direct the litigation
in the manner most likely to result in an award for himself. This
reality necessarily reduces protections for absentee plaintiffs
whose relevant facts differ from those of the representative plaintiffs. Accordingly, an individualized affirmative defense inherently destroys the protection of absentee interests that is central
to the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
requirements of Rule 23(a).
This analysis does not ignore the possibility that a plaintiff
may be able to individually pursue an applicable claim not pursued by the class. The problem arises when, because of a looming
defense, the representative plaintiffs adjudicate the claims that
they do pursue less effectively-from the perspective of some absentee plaintiffs-than if some subset of the class had adjudicated the claims. Such affirmative defenses inherently undermine
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a).
B. Bifurcation Is Not the Answer
A court cannot solve the problems that necessitate the per se
bar by bifurcating a class."' Individualized determinations of liability issues should be distinguished from individualized determinations of damages awards. Many courts have certified classes
for liability determinations while requiring individual trials to
resolve claims for damages. 12 Although a representative plaintiff's motives may change because of the amount of damages he
seeks to collect after a liability finding, one can assume that he
.. Subclasses and bifurcation differ in this analysis. Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), a court
can certify a class but create subclasses which are each individually treated like a class.
This would avoid the conflict of interest problems that necessitate the bar because each
subclass would act individually on all of its issues. Therefore, courts need not apply the
per se bar where they could create subclasses.
"' See Linerboard, 305 F3d at 163 (suggesting a similar bifurcation for individualized
affirmative defenses and damages issues).
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will pursue the best possible litigation strategy to ensure a favorable liability finding, thereby protecting the class on the certified
issues. However, when an individual issue arises in the liability
context, it compromises the principles supporting class action
lawsuits that are embodied in the Rule 23(a) requirements. In a
case with individualized defenses, every plaintiff becomes an inadequate representative of the class because his claims become
atypical of or uncommon to some subset of the class.
Individualized liability issues should not be bifurcated in the
way that damages considerations are bifurcated in the class action context. Any bifurcation of issues gives rise to Seventh
Amendment concerns."' Whenever a second jury considers questions related to issues considered by a first jury, courts worry
that the second jury may in fact revisit the questions decided by
the first jury."4 When bifurcating damages issues only, these concerns lessen because the second jury cannot reconsider the first
jury's liability finding. Moreover, in the damages context, the second jury may not even hear much of the evidence necessary to
form an opinion about liability. This relatively clear distinction
between the roles of the two juries would disappear if, for instance, a first jury dealt with issues of causation and a second
jury decided questions of contributory negligence. The second jury
would have much of the same evidence before it and could essentially nullify the first jury's liability finding under the guise of a
contributory negligence decision. Bifurcation of affirmative defenses, therefore, would not solve the problems corrected by the
per se bar.
While the federal appellate judiciary has avoided certification
based on bifurcated or "phased trials," the Texas state courts
have certified classes under these conditions."' The Texas courts
certify even questionably satisfactory classes, reasoning that the
court may later decertify the class if necessary." 6 Although one
academic commentator advocates the Texas approach by arguing
that a class necessitating such bifurcation can still satisfy the
Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and superiority,"7
.. See In re Visa Check MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F3d 124, 141 n 9 (3d
Cir 2001); Edward F. Sherman, ClassAction Practice in the Gulf South, 74 Tulane L Rev
1603, 1612 (2000).
..
4 See Visa, 280 F3d at 141 n 9.
. See Sherman, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1613-14 (cited in note 114).
.1.See id at 1614-15.
"' See John Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominantand Superiorto None: Class Certification of ParticularIssues UnderRule 23(c)(1)(A), 2002 Utah L Rev 249.
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the federal courts, as well as the Texas Supreme Court, have rejected this approach.18
Because of Rule 23(a)'s demand for the protection of absentee
plaintiffs, courts must be cautious of adopting any class adjudication approach that would lessen the already stripped down rights
of absentee plaintiffs. Since many plaintiffs would not and could
not bring their claims without the class action option, the legal
system allows class action suits. 9 However, the class mechanism
reduces protections for absentee plaintiffs simply because these
plaintiffs lack control over, and perhaps even knowledge of, the
litigation of their own legal claims.' 20 The class action mechanism
does not authorize courts to implement additional measures that
lessen protections for absentee plaintiffs. Rather, the reduced
protections in the class setting require courts to guard absentee

rights with an increased vigor. 121

Bifurcation of issues involving affirmative defenses further
reduces protections for absentee plaintiffs. If a court acknowledges that individual plaintiffs will have varying litigation
strategies and varying facts to prove when addressing affirmative
defenses, it cannot find that the representative plaintiffs will
adequately protect the absentee plaintiffs' interests on the class
liability issues. Because a court cannot examine the merits of
each individual's case at the certification stage,1 2 bifurcation on a
case-by-case basis is inappropriate. Moreover, because the federal
appellate judiciary reluctantly engages in issue bifurcation, absentee class plaintiffs cannot rely on this adjudication approach
to protect their interests. 12

...See Sherman, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1607-10 (cited in note 114).
19 See Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 Duke L J 1251, 1272 (2002) (explaining that the class action device provides
some plaintiffs with the only practical legal means of pursuing their claim).
2'
See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with
Rights We Find There, 9 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 1, 12-13 (1995) (noting that throughout litigation, a class member may never know that a court is determining her legal
rights).
"' See id at 21-22 (cited in note 120) (noting that the vulnerability of criminal defendants and absent class members leads courts to conclude that these powerless players
require more protections, but pointing out that fewer obligations are placed on the attorneys who represent these groups).
See Eisen, 417 US at 177.
r See Sherman, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1613-14 (cited in note 114).
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C. The Per Se Bar Should Apply Only to Rule 23(a)
In contrast to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) requires a balancing test. The First
Circuit correctly pointed out that a per se rule applicable to Rule
23(b)(3) would ignore the "essence of the predominance inquiry. " '24 The predominance requirement demands only that
common issues constitute a significant part of each individual
case.' 2 While an affirmative defense may weigh against a finding
of predominance, it does not necessarily preclude a finding that
the class meets the requirement.'2 Therefore, although the per se
bar makes sense in the Rule 23(a) context, it does not logically
flow from the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement.
Courts have noted that it is often harder for potential plaintiff classes to satisfy the predominance requirement than it is to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a).'2 A plaintiff class trying to
satisfy the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) need not show
that every single plaintiff would try the case in exactly the same
way. The class must, however, show that the representative
plaintiffs have enough in common with the absent plaintiffs to
indicate that they intend to move the litigation in a direction
agreeable to the entire class.'28 However, to satisfy predominance
under Rule 23(b)(3), the representative plaintiff must further
show that these common issues dominate in the case.m Even if
the plaintiffs had five legal theories in common, and this commonality ensured that the representative plaintiffs would pursue
rigorously a beneficial course of litigation, a court may not find
the predominance requirement satisfied if the representative
plaintiffs had fifteen other legal theories, applicable only to them.
In contrast, affirmative defenses may not affect the Rule
23(b)(3) predominance inquiry because despite the fundamental
problems that they pose, a court may find that common issues
still dominate the litigation. A single affirmative defense does not
necessarily affect the fact that plaintiffs have numerous claims,
124
15

Mowbray, 208 F3d at 296 n 4.
Jenkins v Raymark Industries, Inc, 782 F2d 468, 472 (5th Cir 1986) (finding that

predominance is satisfied if common issues are a significant part of the individual cases).
121 Mowbray, 208 F3d
at 296.
" See Jenkins, 782 F2d at 472 (noting the low threshold for satisfying the commonality requirement).
12
See id (noting that commonality and typicality seek to find simply a similarity in
legal and remedial theories).
12 See id.
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facts, and legal theories in common."O A possible conflict on a
single claim may not necessarily destroy predominance within a
class. Similarly, a single affirmative defense does not inherently
undermine the mandates of Rule 23(b)(3). On the other hand, a
single individualized affirmative defense does destroy a class's
ability to satisfy Rule 23(a) because it undermines the representative plaintiffs' ability to adequately represent the interests of
absentee plaintiffs with different factual claims.
One could argue that courts should have the opportunity to
determine an affirmative defense's effect on a class on a case-bycase basis. However, affirmative defenses inherently undermine
the principles of Rule 23(a) that require the protection of absentee plaintiffs' interests."' The only way that a judge could determine otherwise would be by examining the merits of the case and
finding that the defense was unlikely to succeed. The per se rule,
therefore, simply protects courts from violating the Eisen doctrine.
D. Why the Distinction?
It may appear that the application of the per se bar only to
Rule 23(a) is irrelevant because the Rule 23(a) requirements are
prerequisites to a court ever pursuing Rule 23(b) inquiries. A per
se bar for individualized affirmative defenses at either stage
would prevent certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. Yet,
adopting this position would seriously affect Rule 23(b)(1) and
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.
Clarifying the proper application of the per se bar may result
in fewer mandatory class certifications. This result properly addresses the concerns of fairness that courts often have for absentee plaintiffs in mandatory classes. 132 In fact, individual issues
can be more damaging in mandatory class actions than they are
in opt-out class actions.3 It is essential to ensure that absentee
plaintiffs' interests are protected in a litigation system where
each plaintiff has only a single opportunity to adjudicate his

" See Jenkins, 782 F2d at 472 (noting that plaintiffs can satisfy the commonality
requirement simply by showing that there is a need for and benefit from the combination
of claims into a class action).
13,See Falcon, 457 US at 157-58 n 13.
131 See Santiago v City of Philadelphia,72 FRD 619, 628-29
(E D Pa 1976) (discussing
the effect of individual damages issues on a Rule 23(b)(2) class action).
"' See id at 628-29.
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claim. Accordingly, the per se bar will give plaintiffs protection in
the cases in which they need it most.
III. THE PER SE BAR FLOWS DIRECTLY FROM SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT

The per se bar provides courts with a means to maneuver
within the framework provided by Eisen and Falcon. It prevents
courts from inquiring into the merits of a defense at the certification stage, while still allowing them to probe behind the pleadings as necessary. While the Broussard court did not specifically
explain the per se bar as a means of satisfying Eisen and Falcon,
it apparently did not intend to upset either Supreme Court decision.3" Therefore, although the Fourth Circuit may have misread
the Ninth Circuit's precedent when it adopted the per se bar, this
should not lead other courts to discount the Fourth Circuit's position.
The Fourth Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit's Dalkon decision
when it called for the per se bar.1 35 The Dalkon court discussed
the possible impropriety of class certification in the products liability context because individual issues often outnumber common issues in those types of cases.1 3 The court then cited affirmative defenses as the only example in support of its concern about
individual issues. 37 The court determined that the class in
Dalkon met neither the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation nor any of the Rule
23(b)(3) requirements. 13
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning does not necessarily lead to the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Broussard. The Dalkon decision
merely pointed to affirmative defenses as one of many individualized issues in the case.1 39 The combination of numerous individu4°
alized issues led the court to find certification inappropriate.
Moreover, although neither the Broussard nor the Dalkon courts
discussed the issue, given the Ninth Circuit's still valid Williams

'" The Broussard court cited Eisen and Falcon for propositions not relating to its
holding on the per se bar.
See Broussard, 155 F3d at 342.
See Dalkon, 693 F2d at 853.
131 See id.
See id at 854-56.
13 See id at 853-54.

...See Dalkon, 693 F2d at 853-56.
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precedent, it is unlikely that the Dalkon court intended the

Fourth Circuit's result. 141

One should not then conclude, however, that the Fourth Circuit's position lacks precedent. In fact, the Fourth Circuit's position flows directly from the Supreme Court's Eisen decision. The
Fourth Circuit scrupulously followed Eisen's command that a
court must not inquire into the merits of a case at the certification stage. The Fourth Circuit may have feared that a court
could only allow certification in the face of individualized affirmative defenses by violating the Eisen rule, inquiring into the merits, and determining that the defense was unlikely to prevail. The
per se rule protects against such violations.
Moreover, the Broussardposition does not contradict Falcon,
but rather allows courts to obey the dictates of that case as well.
Under Falcon, a court can probe behind the pleadings to determine whether a class meets the Rule 23 requirements.'4 The per
se bar would not apply in a case where a court probed behind the
pleadings and found that an affirmative defense was improperly
pled or was used as a shielding tactic by defendants. Yet Falcon
does not permit a court to go further and determine if the defense
actually has merit." A court would have to apply the per se bar if
it determined that the defense was properly and legitimately
pled. The Broussard court apparently did not intend to reject the
Falcon holding. In fact, the court actually cited Falcon for support
of another proposition." Therefore, although it may appear that
the Broussard court did not base its position in the precedent
that it cited, the per se bar does provide a way of resolving the
Eisen-Falcon tension while adhering to the spirit of these decisions. It does not allow courts to consider the merits of an affirmative defense, but it does authorize them to look beyond the
pleadings in order to assess their frivolity.'4

"' See Williams, 529 F2d at 1388 (finding that individualized issues, such as a statute
of limitations defense, did not necessarily preclude class certification in a federal securities law case).
141 See Eisen, 417
US at 177.
113See Falcon,457 US at 160.
...See id.
See Broussard, 155 F3d at 337 (quoting Falcon regarding the role of the commonal1'
ity and typicality requirements).
,' For development of this argument, see Part IV B.
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IV. COURTS MUST STRICTLY ADHERE To THE RULE OF EISEN

As the Supreme Court specifically stated, the Eisen decision
protects both plaintiffs and defendants. 14 Therefore, in conjunction with Falcon, courts should scrupulously follow Eisen's mandates to avoid harm to absentee plaintiffs and to prevent plaintiffs from coercing defendants into settling cases involving weak
claims and allegations.'4 Moreover, this approach does not provide defendants with an opportunity to engage in strategic behavior in order to avoid class certification because Falcon allows
courts to foil such attempts. 49
A. Following Eisen and Falcon-Even in the Face
of Uncertainty
While adherence to the holdings of both Eisen and Falcon has
generated some uncertainty, courts should continue to scrupulously follow both decisions. This path best protects the policy
interests that motivated the Supreme Court in formulating these
two opinions. Most courts have properly toed, and continue to toe,
the line between the two principles. 0
Courts understand that Eisen strictly prohibits any merits
inquiries at the certification stage. For example, the Fifth Circuit,
in Miller v Mackey International,Inc,' 5' worried that evaluating
the merits of a case may convert a certification decision into a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment."2 Like the
Supreme Court in Eisen, the Fifth Circuit in Miller said that the
See Eisen, 417 US at 177-78.

But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class CertificationBased on Merits of the Claims,

69 Tenn L Rev 1, 4-5 (2001) (arguing for a reversal of Eisen by requiring
judges to estimate the value of the damages of the class claims and the number of claims
involved in
the suit).
'49See Falcon, 457 US at 160 (noting that courts can probe behind the
pleadings to
determine the propriety of class certification).
0 See, for example, Love, 733 F2d at 1564 (stating that
although a trial court cannot
look at the merits of a case at the certification stage, a court should not artificially
invoke
this principle to avoid examining the necessary factors in a certification decision);
Blackie
v Barrack, 524 F2d 891, 901 (9th Cir 1975) (noting that because a trial
judge cannot engage in a preliminary merits inquiry at the certification stage, he must necessarily
decide
the issue with some speculation); Huff v N.D. Cass Co of Alabama, 485 F2d
710, 714 (5th
Cir 1973) (recognizing the tension between Falcon, which requires courts
to find out about
the plaintiffs' claims at an early stage, and Eisen, which limits the courts
inquiry).
151 452 F2d 424 (5th Cir 1971).
12 See id at 428 (overturning a district
court's denial of class certification because of
the belief that the plaintiff's claim lacked merit and that certification
could seriously
harm the defendant).
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language and history of Rule 23 forbid such an inquiry.' The
court pointed out that the "[flailure to state a cause" of action is
entirely distinct from a failure to state a class action. '5
Consequently, courts have adhered to the Eisen rule even
when it results in rendering certification decisions with some uncertainty. 5 The Ninth Circuit noted that pursuant to the Eisen
rule, judges necessarily must base their certification decisions on
some degree of speculation." One Oregon district court certified a
class although it lacked certainty regarding even the class members' standing to bring the suit."7
Yet, not all 'courts have adopted this approach. The Seventh
Circuit, in Szabo v Bridgeport Machineries,Inc, 1" argued against
blind adherence to the Eisen principle." 9 In an opinion by Judge
Easterbrook, the court held that a judge should make any factual
and legal inquiries necessary in order to properly apply Rule 23,
even when this approach leads to a preliminary inquiry of the
merits of a claim. 6 ° The court further argued that Eisen does not
stand for the proposition that a court may not look at the merits
to determine if a proposed class satisfies the Rule 23 requirements.16 ' Rather, Eisen only prohibits courts from actually deciding cases at the certification stage. 62 The court cited Falcon for
the proposition that the "similarity of claims and situations must
be demonstrated, rather than assumed."163 This interpretation is
at odds with other courts' applications of the Falcon and Eisen
"" Id.
154

Id.

. Rule 23(c)(1) allows a judge to certify a class conditionally so that he may alter or
amend his decision at any time prior to a decision on the merits. FRCP 23(c)(1). However,
none of the cases cited in note 150, which support the proposition that courts often certify
classes with uncertainty, were resolved by conditional certification.
" See Blackie, 524 F2d at 901 (approving conditional certification of a class alleging
violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78(j)(2000)).
"' See Oregon Laborers Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v PhillipMorris, Inc,
188 FRD 365, 370-71 (D Ore 1998) (certifying class of union trust funds that provided
health care to tobacco-addicted employees).
'" 249 F3d 672 (7th Cir 2001).
. See id at 676 (expressing concern that the defendants' inclination to settle class
action suits requires courts to make informed certification decisions).
160

Id.

Szabo, 249 F3d at 677. Compare Dwight J. Davis and Karen R. Kowalski, Use and
Misuse of Expert Opinions at the Class CertificationStage: Use of Expert Opinions Should
Not be Permitted, but if Courts Continue to Do So, Defendants Must Attack the Expert's
Qualifications and Present Their Own, 69 Def Couns J 285, 289 (2002) (arguing that the
Szabo court did not intend to violate the Eisen requirements because it limited itself to
pursuing only those inquiries necessary to determine the propriety of class certification).
"' Szabo, 249 F3d at 677.
'

16

Id.
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rules. 164 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case so
that the district court could pursue a merits inquiry. 11 5 The Szabo
case is best viewed as demonstrating the frustration that courts
have had in balancing the Eisen and Falcon rules, and as a departure from both.
If followed, the Szabo holding would lead to the very danger
that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Eisen and would contradict the position articulated in Falcon. Plaintiffs effectively
would enjoy the benefit of a class action-a determination on the
merits-before they had met the requirements of class certification. 166 A representative plaintiff could use a judge's favorable
opinion on the merits of a case to pressure the defendants into a
167
blackmail settlement.
The Supreme Court adequately addressed Szabo's concerns
about Eisen in Falcon by allowing judges to avoid relying on insufficient pleadings at the certification stage.168 Falcon thus provides courts with the opportunity to make the inquiries necessary
to apply Rule 23 without allowing courts to determine the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits at the certification
stage.169 The Rule 23 requirements do not involve questions about
the probability of prevailing on the merits; therefore, a merits
inquiry would never be necessary in rendering a certification decision.17 ° The Rule 23 requirements deal with the structure and
probable projection of a lawsuit. Following this course does not
mean that courts simply must consider the merits of claims and
defenses without any evidence. Courts must only determine if,
under the facts and law pled, a genuine issue exists as to whether
an affirmative defense would apply.

' See, for example, Love, 733 F2d at 1564; Blackie, 524 F2d at 901; Huff, 485 F2d at
714.
165

Szabo, 249 F3d at 678.

"' See Eisen, 417 US at 177-78.
...See In re Rhone-PoulencRhorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir 1995) (allowing

writ of mandamus to permit review of a certification decision because of plaintiffs' opportunity to use certification to blackmail large settlements from defendants).
'" See Falcon, 457 US at 160 (noting that the pleadings sometimes lack clarity on the
issues of fairness to absentees' interests).
166 See Love, 733 F2d at 1564 (arguing that a court should be allowed to make informed decision on whether Rule 23 requirements are met without reaching the merits of
the claims).
170

See FRCP 23.
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B. Strict Adherence to Supreme Court Precedent Serves Both
Plaintiffs and Defendants
Strict adherence to the principles set forth by the Supreme
Court in Eisen and Falcon best serves the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. Merits inquiries at the certification stage tip
the balance of a lawsuit in favor of one party and create opportunities for "blackmail settlements."17' 1 This concern exists not only
when dealing with the merits of a plaintiffs complaint, but also
when considering a defendant's affirmative defenses. No element
of a class action lawsuit should be considered on the merits at the
certification stage. 17 2 Moreover, this approach does not require
courts to ignore bad faith attempts to defeat class certification. A
court can assess the frivolity of an affirmative defense under the
principle of Falcon.173
One of the rationales for the Eisen decision was that merits
inquiries at the certification stage give plaintiffs an unfair advantage. 17 4 Although the class action device developed primarily as a
tool to assist plaintiffs, the Court found that inquiring into the
merits of a claim at the certification stage would bestow the benefits of a class action upon the potential plaintiff class before it had
satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.' If a putative class found
that a judge favored its case on the merits, it may have more leverage in extracting settlements from defendants, even though
defendants may have won the case upon a full showing of the evidence. 17 6 The Court also worried that such preliminary decisions
about the merits may unfairly burden absentee plaintiffs.17 7 An
unfavorable statement by the court prior to a full presentation of
the evidence and legal claims could diminish an absentee plaintiff's opportunities for success before he has had a chance to litigate his claims, personally or through a certified representative. 76

See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1298 (noting that after a plaintiff class is certified, a
defendant may feel an intense pressure to settle in order to avoid the looming possibility
of bankruptcy).
172

See Eisen, 417 US at 177.

"' See Falcon, 457 US at 160.
171

15

See Eisen, 417 US at 177.
Id.

171

See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1298.

177

Id.

178 Id.
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Nevertheless, at least one academic article advocates reconsideration of the Eisen rule. 7 9 Professors Robert G. Bone and
David S. Evans contend that if judges do not inquire into the
merits of a claim, parties simply can create frivolous claims or
defenses in order to bolster or undermine findings under Rule
23.80 They argue that when a defendant presents an affirmative

defense contending that the plaintiffs' claims completely lack
merit, a judge must determine how closely to examine the merits
of the defense.'81 However, Falcon provides the solution to these
concerns by allowing courts to seek and foil frivolous defenses.182
Under Falcon, at the certification stage, a court can determine
whether a defense will present a genuine issue in the case by
83
looking beyond the pleadings. 1

Additionally, although inverse motivations in the certification process could lead plaintiffs to create frivolous claims in order to achieve certification, courts have relied on Eisen and Falcon to deal with those situations.18 4 Courts should afford defendants the same trust and deference that they afford plaintiffs.
Although the class action device developed primarily as a means
to protect plaintiffs and give them an opportunity to bring claims
that they may not have pursued otherwise, the certification process must provide some protections for defendants as well. The
Supreme Court emphasized this notion by specifically noting that
the Eisen decision would prevent plaintiffs from receiving a determination on the merits before they had met the requirements
of Rule 23.185
The distinction between a frivolity inquiry and a merits inquiry is not merely theoretical. In fact, federal courts make an
analogous distinction when they determine whether they have
federal question jurisdiction over a claim. The Supreme Court
has stated that a court should generally assume that a complaint
alleging a controversy under the laws of the United States provides a jurisdictional basis. 86 The Court noted that while a com"' See Bone and Evans, 51 Duke L J at 1253-58 (cited in note 121) (arguing that the
importance of settlement in creating procedural rules has increased since Eisen).
,SOSee id at 1269.
, Id at 1271.
182 See Falcon, 457 US at 160 (allowing courts to probe behind the pleadings before

ruling on certification).
113 See
id.
"" See id. See also Eisen, 417 US at 177.
See Falcon, 457 US at 177-78.
, See Bell v Hood, 327 US 678, 681-82 (1946) (holding that a claim seeking money
damages for alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations by FBI agents invoked fed-
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plaint must present a federal question, whether a complaint
states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted is a
question of law and must be decided after a court has assumed
jurisdiction. 187 However, an exception to this rule does exist. A
federal court can dismiss a claim for lack of jurisdiction when the
claim that invokes a federal question "appears to be immaterial
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where
such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous."188 Thus, this
jurisdictional example demonstrates another instance in which
courts pursue frivolity inquiries early in a lawsuit without undertaking merits inquiries.
The Supreme Court has performed frivolity inquiries in the
federal question jurisdiction context.18 9 In Illinois Central Railroad Co v Adams," the Court found that a claim seeking to enjoin the railroad commission from taxing a particular railroad
line was neither insubstantial nor frivolous. 9 ' The claim set forth
relevant constitutional provisions, a proposed interpretation of
those provisions under the case law, a settled rule of state property law, the current law of tax exemptions, provisions of the corthe exemption.'
poration's charter, and the contracts asserting
The Court found these pleadings sufficient to pass a frivolity test
but refused to consider whether the defendant enjoyed immunity
as a representative of the state because that issue presented a
question on the merits. 93
This analogous context demonstrates the distinction between
a frivolity inquiry and a merits inquiry that also should apply to
class certification involving affirmative defenses. A court can look
to the pleadings and determine if sufficient law exists to support
a claim. The court can assess whether the facts of the case present a genuine issue as to whether the asserted law may apply.
The court need not decide how to interpret the law, whether the
facts satisfy the requirements of the law, or whether the law
eral subject matter jurisdiction even though it was not clear whether the law allowed for
money damages in this context).
...See id at 682.
...
Id at 682-83.
189 See Illinois Central Railroad Co v Adams, 180 US 28 (1901) (finding federal jurisdiction over a claim seeking to enjoin a railroad commission from taxing a particular rail
line even though it was unclear if defendant enjoyed immunity as a representative of the
state).
.. 180 US 28 (1901).
Id at 35.
192 Id at 35-36.
Id at 36-37.

805]

CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION

831

would afford the plaintiffs the relief that they seek. Pursuant to
Falcon and Eisen, the court can look at the pleadings and probe
behind them if necessary to find sufficient law and facts indicating that the asserted defense is not frivolous.'9 The jurisdictional
analogy proves that toeing the line between a frivolity inquiry
and a merits inquiry is possible.
In the jurisdiction context, the Supreme Court has advocated
a presumption in favor of jurisdiction. 95 In the certification context, courts should maintain a presumption against certification.
A presumption in favor of class certification would seriously injure defendants by coercing them into "blackmail settlements."'"
While a court could always decertify a class or grant conditional
certification, some defendants may not wish to take risks and
may settle with an improperly certified class.1 97 On the other
hand, if a plaintiff class does not achieve certification, plaintiffs
could continue to assert their claims individually. Moreover, if
additional discovery indicated the propriety of certification and if
the representative class sought reconsideration of the issue, a
court could grant certification at a later stage.
This wait-and-see approach would balance defendants' and
plaintiffs' interests. One academic article has suggested, however,
that when a defendant faces multiple individual suits, as opposed
to one class action suit, he enjoys an unfair advantage.' 9 Because
of the numerous suits, a defendant is able to approach the litigation on an economy of scale, while the plaintiffs proceed on an allor-nothing basis.'9 Because the defendant presents the same defense repeatedly, he limits the resources expended in each individual case and can improve his defense over time.20 Yet, a class
See Falcon,457 US at 160; Eisen, 417 US at 177.
...
See Bell, 327 US at 682 (stating that a court "must assume jurisdiction to decide
whether allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief as well as to
determine issues of fact arising in the controversy").
' See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1298 (permitting review of a certification decision to
prevent plaintiffs from using certification to blackmail a large settlement from the defendants). See also Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper, and Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 NYU L Rev 74, 143

(1996) (providing an empirical analysis of the prevalence of settlement in cases where
courts certify plaintiff classes).
"' Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 1377, 1402 (2000) ("Risk averse

parties will pay a premium to avoid taking a gamble.").
"'But see id (arguing that without class certification, a defendant has an unfair advantage of treating the cases as it would a class action, namely, on an economy of scale).
..See id.
2

See id.
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deserving certification should achieve certification, even if it occurs after the initiation of individual lawsuits. Any initial advantage to the defendant, therefore, should disappear after certifica2
tion.ml
CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit's adoption of a per se bar to class certification in cases involving individualized affirmative defenses logically flows from the Supreme Court's decisions in Eisen and Falcon. Current law suffers from a lack of clarity. While the Fourth
Circuit first set forth the bar as a requirement of Rule 23(a),
other courts have criticized it as an unnecessary breach of Rule
23(b)(3) requirements. The bar, however, should only apply at the
Rule 23(a) stage of the certification process. The bar protects the
principles supporting the requirements of Rule 23(a), including
the emphasis on protecting absentee plaintiffs' interests.
Affirmative defenses inherently undermine the propriety of
class certification. Even the bifurcation of liability issues cannot
remedy this reality. The per se bar also flows from.and furthers
the goals of Eisen and Falcon. It prevents courts from considering
the merits of plaintiffs' claims while still allowing them to probe
behind the pleadings at the certification stage.

'0' See Sherman, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1615 (cited in note 114) (noting that federal cases
and the Texas Supreme Court do not conform to some Texas state courts' views that certification decisions must be made early and that the presumption should be in favor of certification, but rather hold that the court should conduct discovery to fully understand the
claims and defenses of a case before certifying the class).

